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ORIGINAL	RESEARCH	ARTICLE	
	
A	Stitch	in	Time	Saves	Caribbeanization:	
Meta-steering	and	Strategic	Coordination	in	
an	Era	of	Caribbean	Trans-Regionalism	
	
Tavis	D.	Jules	
Loyola	University	Chicago	
	
Abstract:	This	article	sets	out	to	theoretically	explain	the	Caribbean	
Community’s	 (CARICOM)	 integrative	 stalemate.	 It	 argues	 that	 this	
needs	to	be	studied	 in	 light	of	a	changing	regional,	geographic,	and	
geostrategic	 climate.	 A	 shift	 is	 occurring	 from	 ‘endogenous	
regionalism,’	which	 concentrates	 on	 the	Caribbean’s	 historical	 past,	
to	 ‘exogenous	 regionalism,’	 which	 focuses	 on	 creating	 a	 borderless	
Caribbean	 space	 and	 promotes	 Caribbeanization	 through	 the	
Caribbean	Single	Market	(CSM),	which	came	into	force	in	2006,	and	
the	 stalemated	 Caribbean	 Single	 Economy	 (CSE).	 I	 argue	 that	 new	
trans-hemispheric	relations	are	emerging	and	Caribbean	regionalism	
is	now	both	multi-centric—arising	 from	actions	 in	numerous	places	
rather	than	a	single	center—and	also	multi-temporal.	In	this	context,	
mature	 regionalism	 presages	 effective	 governance	 by	 focusing	 on	
deepening	 regional	 structures	 and	 institutional	 arrangements.	 I	
argue	 that	 trans-regionalism	 is	 a	 multidimensional	 process	 that	
moves	away	from	the	spill-over	effects	of	trade	policy	harmonization	
and	 streamlines	 different	 political,	 security,	 economic,	 and	 cultural	
regimes.	I	conclude	by	suggesting	that	 ‘meta-steering’	 in	the	form	of	
‘strategic	 coordination’	 or	 ‘first	 order	 response’	 is	 but	 one	 way	 to	
perceive	the	paused	regional	project.	
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 In	 this	 paper,	 I	 suggest	 that	 a	 novel	 proverbial	 expression—‘A	stitch	 in	 time	 saves	 Caribbeanization’—accurately	 captures	 the	fatality	 inherent	 within	 proclamations	 about	 the	 current	 state	 of	the	Caribbean	Community	(CARICOM).	The	consequence	is	that	we	have	 not	 discerned	 that	 the	 political	 project	 of	 Caribbean	regionalism	 is	 currently	 gated,	 an	 important	 sign	 of	 which	 is	 a	return	 to	old	protectionist	measures,	while	 the	 functional	 process	of	regionalization	is	actually	thriving.1	In	other	words,	one	needs	to	distinguish	between	de	jure	state-driven	‘regionalism’	and	de	facto	market-driven	‘regionalization’.2	In	this	context,	two	binary	schools	of	thought	are	emerging:	on	the	one	hand,	‘Caribphiles’	who	assert	that	a	politically	 integrated	CARICOM	 is	 the	way	 forward,	 and,	on	the	other,	‘Caribsceptics’	who	call	for	de-regionalization.3	However,	both	agree	that	a	shift	is	occurring	from	‘endogenous	regionalism,’	which	 concentrates	 on	 the	 Caribbean’s	 historical	 past,	 to	‘exogenous	 regionalism,’	 which	 focuses	 on	 creating	 a	 borderless	Caribbean	 space	 and	 promotes	 Caribbeanization	 through	 the	Caribbean	Single	Market	(CSM),	which	came	into	force	in	2006,	and	the	stalemated	Caribbean	Single	Economy	(CSE).		The	 idea	 of	 Caribbeanization	 is	 not	 new.	 We	 can	 trace	 its	heredities	 to	numerous	attempts	at	establishing	 ‘regional	political	projects,’4	 dating	 back	 most	 notably	 to	 the	 Windward	 Island	Federation	 from	 1833	 to	 1958,5	 the	 Leeward	 Islands	 Federation	from	1671	to	1956,	and	the	West	 Indian	Federation	 from	1958	to	1961.6	 In	 this	 line	 of	 succession,	 CARICOM	has	been	 successful	 at	promoting	 production	 integration	 based	 on	 cooperation	 and	solidarity	among	the	small	(and	micro)	economies	of	its	members.7	While	 pure	 market-based	 integration	 has	 stalled,	 it	 has	 been	resuscitated	 continually,	 with	 the	 latest	 defibrillation	 attempt	applying	 the	 characteristics	 of	 open	 regionalism	 such	 as	 trade	liberalization	and	structural	diversification	to	 increase	production	integration	 of	 goods,	 services,	 and	 capital.8	 In	 other	 words,	 the	movement	 towards	 ‘structured	 integration	 of	 production	 in	 the	Region’	 is	 aided	 by	 the	 governance	 mechanism	 of	 mature	regionalism.9	 In	 this	 paper,	 then,	 mature	 regionalism	 is	 seen	 as	functioning	 on	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	 the	 Revised	 Treaty	 of	Chaguaramas.	 It	 is	 therefore	 defined	 as	 a	 governance	mechanism	and	 not	 as	 a	 political	 process,	 and	 it	 calls	 for	 deeper	 structures,	rather	than	wider	integrative	efforts,	in	order	to	facilitate	collective	decision-making	 that	 ensures	 national	 legislative	 commitment	 to	regional	decisions	and	agreed-upon	objectives.		
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 I	suggest	that	mature	regionalism	presages	effective	governance	by	 focusing	 on	 deepening	 regional	 structures	 and	 institutional	arrangements.	 This	 is	 different	 from	 earlier	 attempts	 at	 regional	deepening,	in	that	mature	regionalism	calls	for	the	management	of	the	integrated	economic	space,	while	open	regionalism	focuses	on	trade	 liberalization	 across	 all	 sectors.10	 As	 such,	 I	 see	 mature	regionalism	 as	 being	 driven	 by	 collaboration	 and	 cooperation	 at	the	 ministerial	 level	 since	 several	 factors	 negate	 the	implementation	deficit	of	regional	decisions	at	the	national	level.11	Thus,	 I	 advance	 that	 a	 trinity	 of	 events	 categorizes	 the	 current	implementation	 deficit	 or	 ‘Caribbeansclerosis’—i.e.	 the	 stagnation	of	Caribbean	integration.12	This	has	occurred	as	member	states	are:		mindful	 of	 multilateral	 agreements	 forcing	 them	 to	 extend	 trade	liberalization;	 seeking	 additional	 preferential	 market	 access	 to	facilitate	 new	 trade	 and	 investment	 requirements;	 and	 attentive	towards	 reducing	 potential	 trade	 diversions	 caused	 by	 other	agreements	negotiated	with	third	parties,	such	as	the	United	States	(US)	and	European	Union	(EU).	This	 article	 sets	 out	 to	 theoretically	 explain	 CARICOM’s	integrative	stalemate.	It	argues	that	this	needs	to	be	studied	in	light	of	 a	 changing	 regional,	 geographic,	 and	 geostrategic	 climate.	 In	essence,	 Caribbean	 leaders	 are	 using	 antiquated	 theoretical	constructs	 to	 understand	 a	 relatively	 new	 phenomenon—that	 is,	Caribbean	regionalism	has	increasingly	metamorphosed	beyond	its	original	 conceptualization	 of	 integrated	 production	 to	 a	 common	market	 and	 now	 into	 a	 prospective	 single,	 integrated	 economy.	Using	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘first-order	 response’—meaning	 ‘strategic	decisions	 about	 how	 to	 adjust	 to	 the	 emerging	nature	 of	 the	new	regional	 political	 economy’13—and	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘trans-regionalism’,14	 I	 suggest	 that	 new	 trans-hemispheric	 relations	 are	emerging.	 These	 are	 multidimensional	 forms	 of	 integration	 with	different	 degrees	 of	 ‘regionness’.	 Also,	 I	 suggest	 that	 CARICOM	 is	now	 engaged	 in	 trans-regional	 relations,	 which	 is	 why	 a	reconceptualization	 of	 the	 spaces	 and	 scales	 across	 which	 it	functions	is	necessary.		The	problem	with	suggesting	 that	 the	Caribbean	Single	Market	and	Economy	(CSME)	has	paused	is	that	the	economic	processes	of	integration	 have	 done	 so	 due	 to	 political	 implementation	 deficits.	Yet	 this	 article	 notes	 that,	 while	 the	 monetary	 aspect	 of	 the	integrative	project	has	indeed	paused,	the	‘functional	spaces’	are	on	track.	 In	 order	 to	 make	 this	 point,	 I	 draw	 on	 regime	 theory	 to	provide	a	way	of	undressing	the	manifestations	of	the	wide	array	of	
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 interregional	 relations	 that	exist	 today.15	The	 focus	here	 is	on	 the	structural	constraints	actors	face	and	their	response.	I	also	review	the	 ways	 through	 which	 CARICOM	 has	 historically	 viewed	regionalism	 and	 suggest	 that	 in	 an	 era	 of	 trans-regional	interdependence,	 Caribbean	 regionalism	 is	 now	 both	 multi-centric—arising	 from	 actions	 in	 numerous	 places	 rather	 than	 a	single	center—and	also	multi-temporal,	involving,	what	Bob	Jessop	calls	 ‘an	 ever	 increasing	 density	 and,	 hence,	 a	 more	 complex	restructuring	 and	 re-articulation	 of	 temporalities	 and	 time	horizons’16	 across	 different	 scales	 that	 are	 ‘operationally	autonomous	 but	 substantively	 interdependent	 systems’.17	 I	conclude	 by	 suggesting	 that	 ‘meta-steering’18	 in	 the	 form	 of	‘strategic	coordination’19	or	‘first	order	response’	is	but	one	way	to	perceive	the	paused	regional	project.		
THE	CHANGING	HEMISPHERIC	CLIMATE:		
FROM	SUB-REGIONALISM	TO	TRANS-REGIONALISM		A	 significant	 number	 of	 hemispheric	 agreements	 now	 define	 the	shift	 from	 ‘government	 to	 governance’20	 or	 ‘government	 to	meta-governance	 (or,	 better,	 meta-steering)’.21	 In	 this	 era,	 which	 is	frequently	defined	as	 ‘governing	without	governance’,22	CARICOM	countries	 simultaneously	 participate	 in	 new	 hemispheric	agreements	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 taking	 part	 in	 their	 own	process,	 the	 CSME.	 These	 agreements	 are	 reinforcing	 trans-hemispheric	 relations,	 and	 forming	 new	 layers	 of	 dialogue	 and	cooperation	 across	 Latin	 American	 and	 Caribbean	 countries.	 I	suggest	here	 that	 trans-regionalism	 is	a	multidimensional	process	that	 moves	 away	 from	 the	 spill-over	 effects	 of	 trade	 policy	harmonization	 and	 streamlines	 different	 political,	 security,	economic,	and	cultural	regimes.		In	 spite	 of	 hemispheric	 peculiarities,	 an	 overall	 pattern	 of	enlargement	 and	 amalgamation	 is	 bolstering	 regional	 as	 well	 as	preferential	 trade	 agreements.	 Since	 more	 than	 half	 of	 current	world	 trade	 takes	 place	 within	 actual	 or	 prospective	 regional	trading	agreements,	trans-regionalism	is	a	geostrategic	exploit	that	takes	 political	 attention	 away	 from	 the	 multilateral	 issues	 dealt	with	in	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO).	At	the	same	time,	as	countries	now	belong	to	customs	unions,	economic	blocs	and	have	signed	 numerous	 Free	 Trade	 Agreements	 (FTAs)	 that	 have	 very	different	trade	rules—typically	being	implemented	across	different	periods—with	both	neighbouring	 countries	and	other	blocs,	FTAs	
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 foster	 a	 range	 of	 phenomena:	 Cross-Regionalism;23	 Transoceanic	Agreements;24	 Polilateralism;25	 Competitive	 Regionalism;26	Additive	Regionalism;27	or	Regionalism	Without	Regions.28		Several	 CARCIOM	 members	 now	 have	 agreements	 with	 more	than	 one	 ‘hub’,29	 agreements	 that	 are	 anchored	 in	 legally	 binding	rule-based	commitments	that	advocate	structural	reforms	and	thus	run	 counter	 to	 the	 aims	 and	 goals	 of	 the	 Revised	 Treaty	 of	Chaguaramas.	 Trans-hemispheric	 and	 trans-regional	 relations	differ	 from	 South-South	 regionalism	 in	 several	 ways.	 On	 the	 one	hand,	 south-south	 regionalism	 is	 categorised	 by	 (i)	 trade-based	regionalism	 and	 it	 is	 inward-orientated,	 (ii)	 regional	 trade	agreements	 (RTAs),	 (iii)	 bipolarity,	 (iv)	 traffic	 reductions,	 and	 (v)	south-south	cooperation	based	on	technical	 transfer.	On	the	other	hand,	 trans-regionalism	 is	 based	 on	 (i)	 cooperation	 and	multilateral	market-driven	consensus,	as	exemplified,	in	the	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	(TPP)	and	the	Asian	Infrastructure	Investment	Bank,	 (ii)	multipolarity,	 and	 (iii)	 outward-oriented	 and	 driven	 by	open	 regionalism.	 Thus,	 trans-regionalism	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	archetypical	first-order	response	to	a	changing	global	environment	by	subsuming	elements	of	South-South	regionalism	(collaboration	and	 cooperation)	 into	 its	 processes	 and	 procedures,	 and	 adding	global	 ‘micro-networking	 links	 between	 various	 communities	(government,	business,	 civil	 societal).’30	Moreover,	 the	new	global	landscape	that	is	dominated	by	‘post-spaces’	also	requires	new	and	innovative	 forms	 of	 institutional	 and	 structural	 governance	mechanisms.	 Put	 more	 properly,	 trans-regionalism	 is	 slowly	becoming	 the	 new	 orthodoxy	 since	 the	 emerging	 and	 frontier	markets	 are	 seeking	 effective	 policy	 instruments	 as	 they	 insert	their	 national	 economies	 into	 an	 era	 of	 post-2015	 development	agenda,	 post-financial	 crisis	 and	 global	 recession,	 post-Ebola	epidemic,	and	post-Arab	Spring.		
The	Changing	Face	of	Regional	and	Hemispheric	Integration		The	 crusade	 towards	 clearer	 governance	mechanisms	 to	 regulate	CARICOM,	 as	 attempted	 in	 the	 Rose	Hall	 Declaration	 on	 Regional	Governance	and	 Integrated	Development,31	 is	a	standard	strategic	maneuverer	by	member	states	to	move	against	the	global	trend	by	reaffirming	statehood.	As	Jessop	has	discussed	more	broadly,	such	action	by	states	does	not			 cede	 their	 claim	 to	 sovereignty	 in	 the	 face	 of	 growing	 complex	interdependence	 and	 [did	 not]	 seek	 to	 enhance	 their	 political	
42		Tavis	Jules 
 capacities	 by	 participating	 in	 hierarchic	 coordination	mechanisms	or	devolving	some	activities	to	private	institutions	and	actors,	[that	would]	 seek	 to	 shape	 and	 steer	 these	mechanisms	 through	meta-steering	practices.	32			In	 fact,	 the	 Rose	 Hall	 Declaration	 reaffirms	 that	 CARICOM	 is	 a	community	 of	 sovereignty	 states,	 and	 continues	 to	 legitimize	principles	 of	 ‘proportionality’	 and	 ‘subsidiarity.’	 The	proportionality	 principle	 emphasises	 that	 ‘institutional	arrangements	devised	for	Community	action	shall	not	exceed	what	is	 necessary	 to	 achieve’33	 actions	 specified	 in	 the	 Revised	 Treaty.		The	 principle	 of	 subsidiarity,	 which	 supports	 the	 principle	 of	proportionality,	stipulates	that	regional	acts	‘would	not	be	pursued	in	cases	where	action	by	 individual	Member	States	 is	 sufficient	 to	achieve	 the	specific	goals	of	 the	Community’.34	 In	 fact,	 later	 in	 the	article,	I	argue	that	CARICOM’s	function	has	been	relegated	to	that	of	 ‘strategic	 coordination’35	 in	 an	 era	 defined	 by	 ‘meta-steering’	(constitutional	 or	 institutional	 design)36	 and	 the	 proliferation	 of	new	governance	mechanisms	(mature	regionalism)	across	all	of	its	core	pillars	 (functional	 cooperation,	 economic	 integration,	 foreign	policy	coordination	and	security).		Historically,	sub-regionalism	in	 the	 form	of	 the	Organisation	of	Eastern	Caribbean	States	(OECS)	was	accepted	as	part	of	the	larger	regional	 project	 as	 it	 did	 not	 threaten	 economic	 integration.	Moreover,	 as	 the	 OECS	 has	 a	 functioning	 economic	 union	 and	monetary	 coordination,	 it	 presents	 an	 example	 of	 how	 the	 larger	Caribbean	 integrative	 project	 could	 function.	 In	 essence,	 sub-regionalism	has	been	tolerated	since	it	does	not	contradict	the	core	principles	 of	 Caribbean	 integration	 in	 that	 six	 of	 the	 seven	 full	members	 of	 the	 OECS	 are	 also	 members	 of	 the	 CSM.37	 In	 1994,	when	 all	 of	 CARICOM’s	 members	 agreed	 to	 be	 members	 of	 the	proposed	Free	Trade	Area	of	the	Americas	(FTAA)—which	was	an	extension	of	the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(NAFTA)—the	future	of	neoliberalism	and	the	ability	of	CARICOM	countries	to	be	 integrated	 into	 the	global	market	with	 the	backing	of	 this	new	trade	powerhouse	looked	great	until	it	was	stalled.		Hemispherically,	 up	 until	 2000,	 the	 regional	 political	 projects	within	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	 Caribbean	 were	 separate	 and	oriented	 along	 cultural,	 ethno-linguistic,	 and	 colonial	 geographic	lines.	This	changed	when	Belize	joined	the	Sistema	de	la	Integración	
Centroamericana	 (SICA).38	 In	 2010,	 four	 years	 after	 the	 CSM	formally	came	on-stream	in	12	of	15	CARICOM	countries,	regional	leaders	 increasingly	 perceived	 new	 ‘existential	 threats’	 that	
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 challenged	 the	 economic	 prosperity,	 food	 security,	 and	 ecological	balance	 of	 integration	 projects.39	 Guyana	 and	 Suriname	 joined	the	Union	of	 South	American	Nations	 (UNASUR),	which	 combined	two	existing	customs	unions,	namely	the	Southern	Common	Market	(MERCOSUR)	 and	 the	 Andean	 Community	 of	 Nations	 (CAN).	 In	2011,	13	CARICOM	states	were	among	the	33	countries	that	signed	the	 Declaration	 of	 Caracas,	 creating	 the	 Community	 of	 Latin	American	 and	Caribbean	 States	 (CELAC)	with	 its	 focus	 on	 deeper	integration.40	In	2012,	Haiti,	Suriname,	and	St	Lucia	acceded	to	the	Bolivarian	 Alliance	 for	 the	 Peoples	 of	 Our	 America	 (ALBA),	 a	socialist	project	of	which	numerous	CARICOM	members—Antigua-Barbuda,	Dominica,	St	Vincent	and	the	Grenadines—had	long	been	members.41	 Additionally,	 CARICOM	 countries	 belong	 to	 other	regional	 zones	promoting	economic	cooperation:	all	 are	members	of	the	Association	of	Caribbean	States,	and	nine	CARICOM	countries	belong	 to	 the	 Sistema	 Económico	 Latin-American	 y	 del	 Caribe	(SELA).42	 Then	 there	 are	 other	 projects	 such	 as	 PetroCaribe:	 a	Venezuelan	subsidized-credit	scheme	for	oil	now	linked	with	ALBA,	which	accounts	12	of	the	15	CARICOM	members.43	Coupled	 with	 this	 cross-pollination	 of	 political	 projects,	 new	hemispheric	 initiatives—such	 as	 the	 Pacific	 Alliance,	 which	 links	free-trading	 Chile,	 Peru,	 Colombia,	 and	 Mexico	 together—are	 on	the	 rise,	 just	 other	 movements	 are	 declining.	 A	 clear	 example	 is	ALBA:	a	particular	vision	of	Latin	American	integration	is	failing	as	the	body’s	 influence	wanes	 in	 the	 aftermath	of	 the	death	of	Hugo	Chávez.	In	fact,	the	proliferation	of	regional	bodies	in	Latin	America	and	 the	 Caribbean	 does	 not	 effect	 a	 more	 amalgamated	 region.	Rather,	 it	highlights	how	economic	 trading	blocs	are	perceived	as	inefficient	and	governments	are	trying	to	keep	their	hands	in	all	of	the	regional	pies,	so	to	speak.		This	 new	 faith	 in	 regionalism	 is	 a	 sign	 that	 governments	 are	looking	 for	 safe	 havens	 in	 a	 period	 of	 protracted	 uncertainty	 and	instability.	Moreover,	the	retreat	towards	the	regional	level	follows	the	 patterns	 of	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s	 that	 created	 the	 Caribbean	Basin	 Economic	 Recovery	 Act,	which	 focused	 on	 providing	 traffic	reduction	 and	 trade	 benefits.	 As	 then,	 so	 too	 now,	 the	 changing	global	environment	means	that	Caribbean	regionalism	will	face	its	own	‘insurgences’	as	questions	around	its	legitimacy	arise.	Among	a	 number	 of	 different	 factors,	 there	 is,	 in	 particular,	 a	 trinity	 of	forces	that	are	reshaping	the	region	at	the	present	moment.44	First,	US	foreign	policy	is	now	pivoting	more	towards	Asia	in	the	form	of	the	 Trans-Pacific	 Partnership	 (TPP)	 while	 the	 Caribbean	 is	 no	
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 longer	 seen	 as	 having	 the	 geostrategic	 importance	 it	 once	 did.	Second,	 China	 is	 slowly	 replacing	 America	 as	 the	 primary	benefactor	in	the	Caribbean	as	it	continues	to	expand	its	influence	via	state	lending,	private	investments,	and	outright	gifts	in	the	form	of	 new	 stadiums,	 roads,	 official	 buildings	 and	 ports.	 At	 the	 same	time,	more	Chinese	nationals	 than	 ever	 are	working	 and	 living	 in	the	 region.	 Third,	 the	 conditionalities	 attached	 to	 the	 European	Development	 Fund,	 now	 in	 its	 10th	 cycle,	 and	 it	 linkages	 to	 the	controversial	 Economic	 Partnership	Agreement	 (EPA)	 call	 for	 the	abolishment	of	preferential	trade	rules.		The	changing	face	of	Caribbean	integration	is	not	only	by	choice.	Rather,	 it	 is	responding	to	a	protracted	global	environment	that	is	now	 defined	 by	 a	 retreat	 towards	 protectionism	 at	 the	 regional	level	or	what	has	been	called	the	rise	of	the	‘gated	global’.45	In	the	case	of	CARICOM,	this	has	invited	speculations	that	it	is	an	obsolete	regional	 project.	 However,	 in	 light	 of	 our	 wider	 argument	 in	 the	paper,	 the	 issue	 is	not	with	CARICOM	per	 se	but	with	 the	ways	 in	which	we	have	sought	to	theorize	it.			
A	NEW	APPROACH	TO	STUDYING	HEMISPHERIC	RELATIONS	
		Historically,	 scholars	have	 focused	on	CARICOM’s	deficit	of	 supra-nationalism	 owing	 to	 a	 form	 of	 inter-governmentalism	 that,	 as	Vaughan	Lewis	put	it,			 recognises	 the	continuing	 importance	of	 individual	member	states	in	determining	 the	path	of	 the	 integration	process,	 as	well	 as	 to	 a	neo-functionalism	 that	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 shared	sovereignty	 or	 the	 collective	 exercise	 of	 such	 sovereignty	 in	specified	areas.46				In	 seeking	 to	 fuse	 inter-governmentalism	 and	 neo-functionalism	together,	 the	 founding	 fathers	 of	 Caribbean	 integration	 sought	 to	guard	 against	 the	 larger	 nations	 taking	 advantage	 of	 the	 smaller	ones.	The	idea	was	that	Caribbean	countries	could	hold	on	to	their	sovereignty	 while	 coordinating	 policy	 decisions	 when	 necessary.	Since	 the	 Revised	 Treaty	 of	 Chaguaramas	 did	 not	 change	CARICOM’s	modus	operandi,	 this	orthodoxy	continues	to	dominate	its	 institutional	 structures	 and	 modes	 of	 governance.	 A	 case	 in	point	 is	 found	 in	 the	 decision-making	 processes	 of	 the	 organs	 of	governance:	 the	 Conference	 of	 Heads	 of	 Government	 and	 the	Council	of	Ministers,	where	decisions	necessitate	one	vote	per	state	and	 can	 be	 held	 to	 Prime	 Ministerial/Presidential	 ransom.	 Neo-
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 functionalism	 is	 a	 hybrid	 of	 functionalist	 and	 federalist	 theories	that	 calls	 attention	 to	 the	 functional	 mechanisms	 and	 goals	 of	 a	given	 integrative	 project.47	 Mention	 of	 federalism	 in	 CARICOM	invites	unease	among	 its	members,	given	 the	disastrous	 failure	of	the	 West	 Indian	 Federation.	 Thus,	 CARICOM	 has	 maintained	 the	mechanisms	 of	 neo-functionalism:	 ‘technocratic	 decision-making,	incremental	change	and	learning	processes’.48		Because	 inter-governmentalism	 and	 neo-functionalism	 are	responsible	 for	 the	 Caribbeansclerosis,	 I	 maintain	 that	 trans-regionalism	 may	 provide	 an	 alternative	 way	 of	 studying—and	theorizing—a	Caribbean	integration	that	is	slowly	being	defined	by	multi-layered	 inter-regional	 relations	 with	 hemispheric	 roots.	 In	other	 words,	 due	 to	 its	 hybrid	 nature,	 CARICOM	 governance	mechanisms—i.e.	mature	regionalism—constitute	a	 form	of	meta-steering	built	around	structured	and	strategic	coordination.		In	the	remainder	of	this	section,	I	suggest	that	CARICOM	should	now	be	viewed	as	a	 trans-regional	regime.	 I	also	show	that	 trans-regionalism	as	a	theoretical	approach	offers	genuinely	new	insight	into	 the	 regional	 processes	 and	 governance	 mechanisms	 that	CARICOM	is	now	involved	in	creating.			
CARICOM	as	a	Trans-Regional	Regime		CARICOM	 has	 historically	 been	 defined	 not	 only	 by	 inter-governmentalism	 and	 neo-functionalism	 as	 its	 formal	 praxis	 but	also	 by	 its	 governance	modus	 operandi,	 which	 is	 shaped	 by	 two	principal	 organs:	 the	 Conference	 of	 Heads	 of	 Government	 of	 the	Caribbean	Community	(CHGCC)	and	its	Bureau	and	the	Community	Council	of	Ministers	(Community	Council)	that	are	assisted	by	four	‘Councils’49	and	three	‘Bodies’.50		In	defining	CARICOM	as	a	trans-regional	regime,	I	first	draw	on	Krasner’s	conceptualization	of	a	regime	as	‘principles,	norms,	rules,	and	 decision-making	 procedures	 around	 which	 actors’	expectations	converge	in	a	given	issue	area.’51	The	defining	feature	of	CARICOM	in	this	regard	stems	from	the	fact	that	it	is	demarcated	by	 its	 own	 self-interest,	 power,	 and	 member	 interactions.52	 In	describing	 it	 in	 this	 way,	 I	 acknowledge	 that	 CARICOM	 now	operates	 in	an	era	defined	by	 institutional	governance	regulations	that	comprise	all	mechanisms	of	orientation,	coordination,	control,	and	 balancing.	 These	 institutional	 regulations,	 which	 advocate	discourse	 and	 agreement	 rather	 than	 authority	 and	 domination,	are	 permanent	 features	 of	 the	 post-bureaucratic	 age.53	 Open	 at	
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 their	 boundaries,	 trans-regional	 regimes	 are	 horizontal	 networks	of	coordination	rather	than	hierarchical	entities.	In	essence,	trans-regional	 regimes	 function	 in	 an	 era	 where	 decision-making	 has	become	flattened	and	stresses	meta-decision-making	rules	instead	of	decision-making	rules	 to	urge	participation	and	empowerment.	For	 the	post-bureaucratic	 regime,	 obligatory	pronouncements	 are	made	 at	 the	 level	 of	 strategy—that	 which	 unifies	 all	 parts	 of	 the	system—consequently	 producing	 binding	 proclamations	 through	this	 mechanism	 by	 demonstrating	 active	 collaboration	 with	others.54		Trans-regionalism	 is	 also	 a	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 new	regionalism.	While	it	has	been	applied	comprehensively	to	describe	the	 group-to-group	 dialogues	 of	 the	Asia-Europe	Meeting	 (ASEM)	framework	 established	 in	 1996,	 I	 suggest	 that	 inter-regional	arrangements	help	us	to	understand	why	the	‘functional	spaces’	of	regionalization	 in	 CARICOM	 have	 succeeded	 while	 the	 monetary	spaces	 suffer	 from	 disharmony.	 The	 plethora	 of	 interregional	arrangements	 beyond	 the	 EU’s	 external	 relations	 is	 expanding	globally.	 Examples	 include:	 ASME;	 Asia	 Pacific	 Economic	Cooperation;	 African,	 Caribbean	 and	 Pacific	 Group	 of	 States;	Europe-Latin	 America	 and	 Caribbean	 Summit;	 Africa-Europe	Summit;	 Forum	for	East	 Asia-Latin	 America	Cooperation.55	 Inter-regional	or	bi-regional	group-to-group	dialogues,	another	defining	feature	 of	 new	 regionalism,	 is	 the	 core	 instrument	 that	 promotes	intra-regional	 cooperation	 at	 the	 ministerial	 level	 in	 the	 form	 of	meetings	 (high-level	 or	 technical)	 and	 the	 launching	 of	 joint	projects	and	programs.56	Inter-regionalism	challenges	the	notion	of	geographical	 proximity	 by	 recognizing	 that	 economic	 distance	 no	longer	 is	 a	defining	 facet	 of	 trade	 competitiveness.57	Unlike	 inter-regionalism—which	 is	 categorized	 by	 the	 ‘relationship	 between	two	 distinct,	 separate	 regions’58	 and	 defined	 by	 region-to–region	dialogue	 to	 manage	 economic	 and	 political	 relations59—‘trans-regionalism	 implies	 the	 establishment	 of	 common	 “spaces”	between	 and	 across	 regions	 in	 which	 constituent	 agents	 (e.g.	individuals,	 communities,	 organisations)	 operate	 and	 have	 close	associative	 ties	with	 each	 other’.60	 Trans-regionalism	builds	 upon	concepts	of	networked	governance61	by	singling	out	a	‘set	of	formal	and	 informal	 institutions	 that	 cut	 across	 and	 connect	 different	geographical	 regions…	 through	 a	 combination	 of	 regional,	 inter-regional	and	bilateral	norms	and	forums’.62	Central	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 trans-regionalism	 is	 the	spatiality	 of	 functional	 projects	 (such	 as	 education,	 health,	 and	
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 transportation)	 that	 are	 shaped	 by	 social	 relations	 and	 in	 turn	constituted	in	spatio-temporal	contexts.	Thus,	such	projects	within	CARICOM	have	come	to	occupy	spatio-temporal	contexts	that	range	from	 structural	 integration	 and	 strategic	 coordination—which	again	 range	 from	 intersystemic,	 based	 on	 interorganizational	negotiation,	 to	 interpersonal	 networking—for	 more	 or	 less	 all-inclusive	 regional	 goals,	 to	 the	 quest	 for	 definite	 CSM	 interests.	Therefore,	 the	 Caribbean	 regional	 space	 is	 experiencing	 growing	infiltration	 (inward	 flows)	 and	 extraversion	 (outward	 flows)	 as	 it	moves	away	for	trade-based	regionalism	and	towards	developing	a	single	market	that	is	expected	to	be	supported	by	different	regimes	(the	movement	of	 goods,	 labour,	 capital,	 services	 and	 the	 right	 to	establishment)	 across	 different	 spaces	 that	 are	 both	 regional	 and	trans-regional.		Dent	 distinguishes	 between	 four	 categories	 of	 trans-regional	spaces	that	are	relevant	to	the	understanding	the	changing	nature	of	 governance	 within	 CARICOM:	 (i)	 economic	 spaces—based	 on	free	trade	areas	and	zones,	customs	unions	and	labor	market	rules	that	 are	 part	 of	 the	 CSM;	 (ii)	 business	 spaces—analogous	 to	economic	 spaces,	 but	 propelled	 by	multinational	 enterprises	 that	regulate	 the	 production	 and	 distribution	 systems;	 (iii)	 political	spaces—overseen	by	supranational	or	 inter-governmental	bodies;	and	 (iv)	 socio-cultural	 spaces—established	 over	 time	 based	 on	common	 cultural	 identities.	 Although	 the	 four	 components	 of	Dent’s	 taxonomy	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 Caribbean,	 some	 might	 also	reasonably	 assert	 that	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 spaces	 are	 in	something	of	a	holding	pattern	due	to	Caribbeansclerosis.	If	we	are	to	 concede	 that	 CARICOM	now	operates	 in	 a	 trans-regional	 space	with	 inadequate	 trans-regional	 institutions	 and	 governance	mechanisms,	 then	we	can	plausibly	acknowledge	 that	 the	pausing	of	the	CSM	and	lacklustre	start	of	the	CSE	is	instigated	by	structural	inefficacies	 of	 a	 system-wide	 incapacity	 rather	 than	 a	 purely	political	 determination.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 novel	 network	 of	entangled	 regional	 relations	 that	 are	 driven	 by	 economic	transnationalism	and	open	regionalism—in	the	form	or	production	integration—is	hard	to	discern.	Thus,	Caribbean	trans-regionalism	is	based	on	the	use	of	horizontal	models	of	governance	(i.e.	mature	regionalism)	 through	 ‘external	 governance’63	 that	 seek	 to	 bind	member	states	into	common	policy	frameworks.64		Finally,	 CARICOM’s	 classification	 as	 a	 trans-regional	 regime	speaks	 to	how	the	rise	of	 ‘third	generation	agreements’	are	 found	in	declarations	like	Rose	Hall	that	call	for	deeper	integration,	which	
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 by	 extension,	will	 increasingly	 incorporate	 policy	 areas	 that	were	previously	a	domestic	preserve.	Since	CARICOM	members	are	now	functioning	 across	 different	 spaces	 and	 scales,	 new	 institutional	mechanisms	 are	 needed	 to	 facilitate	 the	 complexities	 that	 are	arising	at	the	systemic	 level	since	new	domestic	requirements	are	generating	greater	need	for	the	management	of	multiple	and	varied	commitments.	 Membership	 of	 different	 blocs	 implies	 the	acceptance	 of	 highly	 differentiated	 trade	 rules	 that	 can	 be	 both	complementary	to,	and	in	conflict	with,	CARICOM’s	core	mandate.		Therefore,	we	speak	of	a	pausing	of	Caribbean	integration	as	 it	necessitates	 that	 we	 differentiate	 between	 the	 systemic	 level	complexities	 of	 the	 regional	 project	 itself	 and	 the	 rule-making	requirements	that	undergird	the	processes	of	regional	integration.	Moreover,	CARICOM’s	characteristics	of	as	a	trans-regional	regime	also	speak	to	the	fact	that	it	is	no	longer	only	responsible	for	bloc-to-super	 power	 negotiations—i.e.	 with	 the	 US	 or	 EU—but	 must	also	negotiate	with	other	Southern	blocs,	 including	those	of	which	some,	many,	or	all	of	its	members	might	be	part.	In	summary,	CARICOM’s	instrument	of	open	regionalism	and	its	governance	 mechanism	 of	 mature	 regionalism	 has	 given	 a	 very	different	 form	 of	 integration	 to	 that	 found,	 for	 example,	 in	Southeast	Asia—which	Jayasuriya	calls	‘embedded	mercantilism’.65	It	is	distinguished,	at	least	in	part,	with	its	focus	on	ensuring	that:			critical	 policy	 decisions	 of	 the	 Community	 taken	 by	 Heads	 of	Government,	 or	 by	 other	 Organs	 of	 the	 Community,	 will	 have	 the	force	 of	 law	 throughout	 the	Region	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 operation	 of	domestic	legislation.66			This	in	turn	has	paved	the	way	for	trans-regionalism.	It	implies	that	a	 new	 trans-regional	 space	 now	 exists	 since	 the	 two	 regional	projects	 are	 concurrently	 strategically	 coordinating	 the	 spatio-temporal	horizon	in	the	Caribbean.	In	essence,	the	Caribbean	space	has	been	constructed	around	a	hybrid	instrumentality	that	implies	that	open	regionalism	and	deeper	integration	(mature	regionalism)	must	work	 simultaneously	 to	 spur	 national	 development	 through	regional	 means,	 while	 considering	 that	 its	 members	 may	 have	competing	and	conflicting	 interests	since	they	are	parties	to	other	integrative	blocs.						
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Something	 Old,	 Something	 New,	 Something	Mature	 and	 Something	
Blue		
	The	trans-regional	space	that	I	argue	exists	in	CARICOM	can	also	be	viewed	as	a	‘functional	space’.	This	notion	implies	a	space	based	on	the	coordination	of	governance,	 funding,	provision,	and	regulation	of	the	functional	areas	of	regionalism,	such	as	education	and	health.	Against	the	backdrop	of	neoliberal	capitalism,	today’s	international	system	dictates	 that	virtually	all	countries	need	to	be	members	of	at	 least	 one	 bloc	 as	 we	 have	moved	 away	 from	 the	 protectionist	and	interventionist	post–World	War	II	system	of	closed	or	inwards	regional	 modules—that	 used	 import	 substituting	 development	 in	the	 form	 of	 the	 Common	 External	 Tariff	 [CET]67	 as	 the	 basis	 for	development—to	 a	more	 open	 or	 outward	model	 of	 regionalism,	that	gradually	reduced	external	tariffs	on	goods	from	non-member	countries,	 while	 preserving	 duty-free	 access	 on	 intra-regional	trade.		CARICOM	 is	 fundamentally	a	product	of	 the	old	 regionalism	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	that	was	premised	upon	developing	trade	and	dismantling	 tariffs	with	countries	at	more	or	 less	similar	 levels	of	development,	 geographic	 propensity	 and	 proximity.	 To	 support	this	 form	 of	 preferential	 trading	 system,	 the	 Caribbean	 Common	Market	 (CCM)	 was	 developed	 as	 an	 instrument	 within	 the	parameters	 of	 1973	 Treaty	 of	 Chaguaramas.	 As	 an	 instrument	 to	stimulate	 national	 development,	 the	 CCM	 emphasized	 import-substituting	 industrialization,	 and,	 like	 several	 other	 blocs,	 it	 also	experienced	 negligible	 implementation	 of	 its	 proposed	 policies.	This	 implementation	 deficit	 and	 its	 stalemate	was	 also	 driven	 by	the	four	pestilences	of	the	1980s:68	the	oil	crisis	of	1973/74	and	the	oil	 shock	 of	 1977,	 along	 with	 the	 ensuing	 debt	 fatigue;	 the	structural	adjustment	crises	of	 the	1970s	 that	 led	 to	public	sector	reforms	in	all	of	CARICOM’s	member	states;	(the	evaporation	of	the	preferential	 market	 for	 Caribbean	 goods	 (sugar,	 rice,	 rum,	 and	bananas);	 and	 the	 political	 fragmentation/ideological	 pluralism,	that	stymied	economic	integration.69	By	the	end	of	the	1980s,	with	the	fall	of	communism	in	Eastern	Europe,	Caribbean	leaders	sought	to	 renew	 ‘ideological	 and	 policy	 convergence	 among	 member	states’70	 by	 calling	 for	 the	 revision	 of	 the	 ‘three	 Common	Market	Instruments	required	by	the	Treaty	of	Chaguaramas—the	Common	External	 Tariff,	 the	 Rules	 of	 Origin,	 and	 a	 Harmonised	 Scheme	 of	Fiscal	Incentives’71	to	facilitate	the	establishment	of	the	Caribbean	Single	Market	and	Economy	(CSME).		
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 In	 order	 to	 re-conceptualize	 CARICOM	 as	 a	 trans-regional	regime	that	needs	to	function	in	a	trans-regional	space,	researchers	must	recognize	 that	 the	current	challenges	 that	 the	 ‘third	wave	of	regionalism’	or	the	‘new	regionalism’	bring	to	the	Caribbean	basin	are	 vastly	 different	 from	 those	 of	 the	 old	 regionalism—or	 even	open	regionalism—that	dominated	the	agenda	in	the	1990s	as	the	CSME	was	being	conceived.	In	fact,	new	ways	of	thinking	need	to	be	developed	 that	 recognizes	 this,	 noting	 that	while	 the	name	of	 the	political	project	has	changed	the	aim	remains	the	same.	Moreover,	since	 the	 explicit	 call	 of	 Rose	 Hall	 Deceleration	 for	 deeper	integration,	CARICOM	leaders	have	failed	to	take	account	of	the	fact	the	 they	are	applying	a	new	regional	governance	mechanism—i.e.	mature	regionalism—to	a	 system	that	was	built	upon	and	around	supporting	open	regionalism	in	the	form	of	production	integration.	Above	 all,	 they	 have	 not	 acknowledged	 that,	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 new	regionalism,	 is	 a	 drive	 for	 competitiveness,	 not	 simply	 between	blocs	but	within	them	as	well.		The	 new	 trend	 of	 reciprocal	 agreements	 encompassing	 large	swaths	 of	 countries	 that	 fear	 exclusion	 has	 become	 a	 distinctive	feature	of	 the	negotiated	and	regulated	world	 that	 is	governed	by	the	WTO.	 New	modes	 of	 regionalism	 are	 driven	 by	 a	 recognition	that,	 ‘in	 addition	 reducing	 tariffs	 and	 quotas,	 effective	 integration	requires	 the	 removal	 of	 other	 barriers,	 or	 what	 has	 come	 to	 be	known	as	“deep	integration”’.72	Yet	regionalism—in	the	Caribbean,	at	least—is	still	viewed	as	something	of	a	panacea	for	development.			
RETHINKING	CARIBBEAN	INTEGRATION		
	Caribbean	leaders	may	wish	to	train	their	focus	on	a	different	type	of	 governance	 that	 adequately	 captures	 the	 complexities	 of	 inter-governmentalism	 and	 neo-functionalism,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	promoting	 open	 regionalism	 (as	 called	 for	 under	 Grand	 Anse)	through	 the	mechanism	of	mature	 regionalism.	 Such	 an	 approach	would	 rely	 on	 the	 use	 of	 meta-governance	 (organization	 of	 self-organization)	across	spatio-temporal	horizons	and	contexts.		Such	 an	 approach,	which	 focuses	 on	 organizing	 and	 balancing	different	 forms	 of	 coordination	 of	 complex	 reciprocal	 inter-dependence,	 has	 also	 been	 describe	 by	 Jessop	 as	 ‘meta-steering’,	which	 means	 ‘the	 use	 of	 higher-order	 mechanisms	 to	 calibrate	different	 modes	 of	 steering	 (markets,	 states	 and	 other	 forms	 of	imperative	 coordination,	 networks).73	Meta-steering	 is	 not	 simply	advanced	here	as	a	panacea	for	Caribbean	integration	but	rather	as	
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 an	 instrument	 that	 may	 help	 to	 manage	 the	 complexity	 and	plurality	 of	 ‘interdependencies	 without	 undermining	 the	 basic	coherence	and	integrity	of	the	(national)	state’.74	When	embedded	in	 strategic	 coordination,	 meta-steering	 has	 the	 potential	 of	‘exploring	how	one	operationally	autonomous	system	can	influence	the	 operations	 of	 another	 such	 (relatively	 closed)	 system	 by	altering	the	environment	 in	which	the	 latter	reproduces	 itself	and	also	examines	how	governance	mechanisms	might	shape	their	joint	evolution’.75	 In	 other	 words,	 meta-steering	 is	 but	 one	 way	 of	explaining	 how	 the	 Caribbean	 regional	 project	 can	 influence	 the	operations	of	hemispheric	 regional	groupings	and	 the	governance	mechanisms	involved.		The	 functional	 spaces	 within	 CARICOM	 have	 not	 only	 created	successful	 institutions	 under	 close	 regionalism—such	 as	 the	regional	University	of	the	West	Indies	and	the	West	Indies	Shipping	Association76—but	in	an	era	of	new	regionalism	that	glorifies	trade	liberalization,	 new	 institutions	 and	 programs	 have	 arisen	 as	 a	consequence	 of	 ‘new	 mutualism’.77	 Here,	 such	 new	 mutualism	 is	seen	as	being	premised	upon	deeper	cooperation	and	coordination	since	 it	 ‘operates	 as	 a	policy	way	of	 thinking,	 acting,	 and	being	at	the	 regional	 level’78	 and	 it	 is	 defined	 by	 three	 aspects:	 its	 multi-sectoral	 approach;	 the	 adoption	 of	 international	 targets;	 and	 the	establishment	 of	 regional	 benchmarks.	 The	 point	 is	 that	 neo-functional	 or	 functional	 mechanisms	 of	 Caribbean	 regionalism	continue	to	drive	the	economic	dimensions.	Thus,	advances	gained	in	 the	 former,	 which	 are	 outside	 of	 the	 traditional	 institutional	arrangements	that	are	now	a	permanent	feature	of	CARICOM,	show	that	 ‘cooperation	 on	 domestic	 policies	 can	 substantially	 increase	the	gains	from	forming	a	trade	bloc’.79		The	 free	 movement	 of	 Caribbean	 nationals	 has	 been	 clarified	recently	by	 the	Caribbean	Court	of	 Justice	(CCJ)—an	 institution	of	new	 regionalism—in	 Myrie	 vs	 The	 State	 of	 Barbados,	 which	determined	 that	 all	 CARICOM	 nationals	 have	 the	 right	 to	 travel	freely	within	the	Community	with	stays	up	to	six	months.	There	are	only	two	exceptions:	if	a	national	is	seen	to	be	undesirable,	or	if	the	person	 is	 in	 danger	 of	 becoming	 a	 charge	 on	 the	 public	 purse.80	Consequently,	 the	 CCJ	 has	 given	 de	 jure	 credence	 to	 policy	integration	 (in	 the	 form	 of	 intensified	 functional	 cooperation),	which	 is	 the	 principal	 instrument	 of	 regional	 coordination,	harmonization,	and	acceptance.81		In	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 globalization	 and	 regionalism,	 the	small	and	micro-states	of	 the	Caribbean	should	be	seen	no	 longer	
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 just	 as	 parts	 of	 regional	 blocs,	 but	 as	 parts	 of	 trans-regional	hemispheric	ones.	If	we	accept	this	idea,	it	is	not	plausible	to	assert	that	Caribbean	integration	has	paused	in	light	of	the	post-financial	crisis	 and	 global	 recession.	 Rather,	 we	 may	 think	 of	 CARICOM’s	pause	in	going	ahead	with	the	monetary	aspects	of	regionalism	as	a	way	to	reconcile	 inter-governmentalism	and	neo-functionalism	on	the	one	hand,	and,	on	the	other,	two	aspect	that	are	not	necessarily	in	 conflict	 with	 each	 other:	 open	 regionalism,	 which	 aims	 at	widening	the	community,	and	mature	regionalism,	which	is	geared	towards	deepening	it.		What	 is	 required	 in	 this	 time	 of	 pause	 is	 treaty	 amendments	aimed	 at	 establishing	 new	 pillars	 of	 inter-governmentalism	more	complementary	 to	 the	 wave	 of	 neo-functionalist	 cooperative	endeavors.	Conceptually,	the	CSME	calls	for	the	creation	of	a	large	market	space	 to	 intensify	competition	as	 the	community	complies	with	 the	 unilateral	 and	multilateral	 commitments	 assumed	under	the	 WTO.82	 Like	 everything	 else,	 CARICOM	 has	 been	 cautious	 in	trying	to	keep	its	hands	in	all	possible	pies.	While	unilateralism	is	not	a	guarantee	for	CARICOM	countries	to	receive	reciprocity	from	other	trading	partners,	multilateral	liberalization	provides	security,	but	 it	 is	 a	 lengthy	process.	 In	 essence,	 Caribbean	 integration	may	now	be	categorized	as	a	‘labyrinth	of	exceptions	and	derogations’83	that	is	besieged	by	rules	of	origin	that	conflict	with	the	Treaty	and	impedes	joint	negotiating	efforts	with	third	countries.		As	 a	 consequence,	 new	 regional	 organizations	 are	 needed	 to	establish	 cross-border	 supervision,	 since	 economic	 openness	renders	CARICOM	economies	vulnerable	to	external	shocks	caused,	for	 example,	 by	 wild	 fluctuations	 in	 commodity	 prices.	 The	problem	 is	 that	 while	 intra-regionalism	 is	 no	 longer	 the	 aim	 of	CARICOM’s	 integrative	 project,	 it	 continues	 to	 function	 under	 a	protective	common	market	module	that	does	not	support	the	aims	of	the	CSME,	which	calls	for	competitive	production	both	intra-	and	extra-regionally	 as	 well	 as	 hemispherically.	 Thus,	 new	 questions	will	 arise	 that	will	warrant	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 CCJ.	 For	 example,	how	will	 it	 address	Treaty	 violations	 that	may	occur	 if	 a	member	state	 belongs	 to	 several	 hemispheric	 blocs	 with	 different	implementation	rules?	Or,	if	CARICOM	nationals	move	to	a	member	state	 that	 is	 also	 a	 part	 of	 another	 bloc,	 what	 rules	 govern	 their	movement	and	their	right	of	establishment	across	a	non-CARICOM	country?	Such	questions	require	not	only	the	re-thinking	of	the	role	and	function	of	CARICOM’s	integrative	instruments	but	also	a	new	way	 to	conceptualize	a	CARICOM	that	 is	evolving	 in	an	era	of	dis-
Caribbean	Trans-Regionalism		53 
 harmonization,	an	ill-fated	Economic	Partnership	Agreement	(EPA)	that	 has	 not	 delivered	 on	 its	 promise,	 along	 with	 sub-regional	deepening	and	hemispheric	widening.			
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